Erica Shumener
About me
I am an assistant professor of philosophy at Syracuse University. I used to be an assistant professor at Pitt. I work primarily in metaphysics, and I have interests in philosophy of science and epistemology. I am confident that the best Star Wars film is Episode III: Revenge of the Sith.
You can reach me at eshumene@syr.edu.
Papers
- The Power to Govern Philosophical Perspectives 2022 (Abstract) (Link to PDF)
I provide a new account of what it is for the laws of nature to govern the evolution of events. I locate the source of governance in the content of law propositions. As such, I do not appeal to notions of ground, essence, or production to characterize governance. After introducing the account, I use it to outline previously unrecognized varieties of governance. The laws must govern for them to have two theoretical virtues: explanatory power as well as a theoretical virtue I call expansiveness. A theory is expansive, roughly, when it can do more with less. - Intrinsicality and Determinacy Philosophical Studies 2022 (Abstract)
Comparativism maintains that physical quantities are ultimately relational in character. For example, an object’s having 1kg rest mass depends on the relations (such as: less massive than, as massive as, and so on) it stands in to other objects in the universe. Comparativism, its advocates allege, reveals that quantities are not metaphysically mysterious: Quantities are reducible to familiar relations holding among physical objects. Modal accounts of intrinsicality—such as Lewis’s duplication account or Langton and Lewis’s combinatorial account—are popular accounts preserving many of our core intuitions regarding which properties are intrinsic. I argue that to endorse both comparativism and a modal account of intrinsicality, we must reject the plausible thesis that determinable properties are instantiated solely in virtue of their determinates. I call this 'the determinacy tension' and I suggest approaches for dissolving it. - Humeans are out of this World Synthese 2021 (Abstract) (PDF)
I defend the following argument in this paper. Premise 1: Laws of nature are intrinsic to the universe. Premise 2: Humeanism maintains that laws of nature are extrinsic to the universe. Conclusion: Humeanism is false. This argument is inspired by John Hawthorne’s (2004) argument in “Why Humeans are out of their Minds”. My argument differs from his; Hawthorne focuses on Humean views of causation and how they interact with judgments about consciousness. He thinks Humeans are forced to treat certain mental properties (insofar as they involve causal features) as extrinsic to conscious minds. I do not discuss causation or consciousness here. I focus on Humean accounts of laws. I argue that Humean laws are extrinsic to the entire universe. As such, Humeans are not just out of their minds; they are out of this world. I aim to show that premises 1 and 2 are well-supported and that denying either of them comes at a cost. Nevertheless, some Humeans may prefer to reject 1 or 2 rather than give up Humeanism. Even if the Humean takes one of these routes, the argument above has philosophical import: it shows that Humeanism involves surprising commitments. - Do Identity and Distinctness Facts Threaten the PSR? Philosophical Studies 2021 (Abstract) (Link to PDF)
No. - Explaining Identity and Distinctness Philosophical Studies 2020 (Abstract) (PDF)
This paper offers an explanation of object identity and distinctness. It is tempting to try to distinguish objects on the basis of their possessing different qualitative features, where qualitative features are ones that do not involve identity. Yet, this criterion for object identity faces counterexamples: distinct objects can share all of their qualitative features. In order to distinguish objects we need to look not only at which properties and relations objects instantiate but also how they instantiate these properties and relations. I suggest that objects are identical when they stand in certain qualitative relations in virtue of their existence. An object that has a feature in virtue of its existence has that feature existentially. The proposal is that objects are identical when they stand in specific relations existentially. Objects are distinct if they do not stand in the same kinds of relations to one another in virtue of their existence; distinct objects stand in those relations non-existentially. - Identity Routledge Handbook for Metaphysical Grounding 2020 (Abstract) (PDF)
This is a chapter for the Routledge Handbook for Metaphysical Grounding. I discuss the relationship between identity criteria and ground. I also discuss whether and how to ground identity and distinctness facts. - Building and Surveying: Relative Fundamentality in Karen Bennett's Making Things Up Analysis 2019 (Abstract) (PDF)
I discuss Bennett's characterization of the more fundamental than relation. - Laws of Nature, Explanation, and Semantic Circularity The British Journal for Philosophy of Science 2017 (Abstract) (Link to PDF)
Anti-Humeans come in many varieties, but Anti-Humeans about laws are united in their opinion that laws must be something “over and above” the Humean mosaic. My aim is to defend Anti-Humean accounts of laws against Humean accounts. Here I argue that Anti-Humean accounts of laws are preferable to Humean accounts because Humean laws lack explanatory power. - The Metaphysics of Identity: Are Identity and Distinctness Facts Fundamental? Philosophy Compass 2017 (Abstract) (PDF)
This is a (weakly) opinionated survey paper. Identity and distinctness facts are ones like, "The Eiffel Tower is identical to the Eiffel Tower", and "The Eiffel Tower is distinct from the Louvre." This paper concerns one question in the metaphysics of identity: Are identity and distinctness facts metaphysically fundamental or are they nonfundamental? I explore some answers to this question.
(Short) Book
- Identity Cambridge University Press Elements Series 2022 (Abstract) (Link) (Notes and Errata)
This book will discuss certain leading principles in the metaphysics of identity and the puzzling phenomena surrounding these principles. I focus on what’s commonly referred to as “Leibniz’s Law”, the conjunction of the Principle of the Identity of Indiscernibles and the Principle of the Indiscernibility of Identicals. Together, these two principles capture the plausible thought that, necessarily, any entities x and y are identical if and only if they share all the same features or properties. This book ties together discussions of Leibniz’s Law from somewhat disconnected debates in metaphysics, philosophy of science, and philosophy of language. I examine the reasons for and against accepting Leibniz’s Law with a focus on contemporary treatment of the topic. Next, I explore some options for rejecting the two principles. Philosophers offer modifications that aim to evade the counterexamples facing Leibniz’s Law, and we will see how they fare. The latter part of the book concerns the form identity criteria should take. Leibniz’s Law provides necessary and sufficient conditions for when entities x and y are identical. These are sometimes called material or modal identity criteria. We can also try to formulate explanatory identity criteria. Explanatory identity criteria attempt to provide an explanatory basis for the identity and distinctness of entities. They tell us in virtue of what entities are identical or distinct. I explore the prospects for developing explanatory identity criteria and frameworks for formulating such criteria in terms of the notion of metaphysical ground.
Website
Thanks to Martín Abreu Zavaleta for designing this website.