Erica Shumener

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About me

I am an assistant professor of philosophy at Syracuse University. I used to be an assistant professor at Pitt. I work primarily in metaphysics, and I have interests in philosophy of science and epistemology. I am confident that the best Star Wars film is Episode III: Revenge of the Sith.

You can reach me at eshumene@syr.edu.

Papers

• Permeating Properties R&R at Oxford Studies in Metaphysics Runner-Up 2024 Sanders Prize in Metaphysics (Abstract)

  
  “Qua” or “as a” constructions appear in many philosophical contexts, including in metaphysics, philosophy of religion, philosophy of language, and philosophy of action. One important function of qua-ascriptions is to block violations of Leibniz’s Law. We can truthfully state that the old Penn Station was destroyed qua building and that the old Penn Station still exists qua pile of bricks without claiming that the old Penn Station was destroyed and still exists. That is, we can sometimes claim that an object x is F qua G without concluding that x is F. This paper uses the notion of real definition to provide an account of when we can and cannot infer x is F from the fact that x is F qua G. I apply the proposal to cases that potentially threaten Leibniz’s Law and explain how my proposal can be adopted by different metaphysical theories of qua-ascriptions.

• The Power to Govern Philosophical Perspectives 2022 (Abstract) (Link to PDF)

  
  I provide a new account of what it is for the laws of nature to govern the evolution of events. I locate the source of governance in the content of law propositions. As such, I do not appeal to notions of ground, essence, or production to characterize governance. After introducing the account, I use it to outline previously unrecognized varieties of governance. The laws must govern for them to have two theoretical virtues: explanatory power as well as a theoretical virtue I call expansiveness. A theory is expansive, roughly, when it can do more with less.

• Intrinsicality and Determinacy Philosophical Studies 2022 (Abstract)

  
  Comparativism maintains that physical quantities are ultimately relational in character. For example, an object’s having 1kg rest mass depends on the relations (such as: less massive than, as massive as, and so on) it stands in to other objects in the universe. Comparativism, its advocates allege, reveals that quantities are not metaphysically mysterious: Quantities are reducible to familiar relations holding among physical objects. Modal accounts of intrinsicality—such as Lewis’s duplication account or Langton and Lewis’s combinatorial account—are popular accounts preserving many of our core intuitions regarding which properties are intrinsic. I argue that to endorse both comparativism and a modal account of intrinsicality, we must reject the plausible thesis that determinable properties are instantiated solely in virtue of their determinates. I call this 'the determinacy tension' and I suggest approaches for dissolving it.

• Humeans are out of this World Synthese 2021 (Abstract) (PDF)

  
  I defend the following argument in this paper. Premise 1: Laws of nature are intrinsic to the universe. Premise 2: Humeanism maintains that laws of nature are extrinsic to the universe. Conclusion: Humeanism is false. This argument is inspired by John Hawthorne’s (2004) argument in “Why Humeans are out of their Minds”. My argument differs from his; Hawthorne focuses on Humean views of causation and how they interact with judgments about consciousness. He thinks Humeans are forced to treat certain mental properties (insofar as they involve causal features) as extrinsic to conscious minds. I do not discuss causation or consciousness here. I focus on Humean accounts of laws. I argue that Humean laws are extrinsic to the entire universe. As such, Humeans are not just out of their minds; they are out of this world. I aim to show that premises 1 and 2 are well-supported and that denying either of them comes at a cost. Nevertheless, some Humeans may prefer to reject 1 or 2 rather than give up Humeanism. Even if the Humean takes one of these routes, the argument above has philosophical import: it shows that Humeanism involves surprising commitments.

• Do Identity and Distinctness Facts Threaten the PSR? Philosophical Studies 2021 (Abstract) (Link to PDF)

  
  No.

• Explaining Identity and Distinctness Philosophical Studies 2020 (Abstract) (PDF)

  
  This paper offers an explanation of object identity and distinctness. It is tempting to try to distinguish objects on the basis of their possessing different qualitative features, where qualitative features are ones that do not involve identity. Yet, this criterion for object identity faces counterexamples: distinct objects can share all of their qualitative features. In order to distinguish objects we need to look not only at which properties and relations objects instantiate but also how they instantiate these properties and relations. I suggest that objects are identical when they stand in certain qualitative relations in virtue of their existence. An object that has a feature in virtue of its existence has that feature existentially. The proposal is that objects are identical when they stand in specific relations existentially. Objects are distinct if they do not stand in the same kinds of relations to one another in virtue of their existence; distinct objects stand in those relations non-existentially.

• Identity Routledge Handbook for Metaphysical Grounding 2020 (Abstract) (PDF)

  
  This is a chapter for the Routledge Handbook for Metaphysical Grounding. I discuss the relationship between identity criteria and ground. I also discuss whether and how to ground identity and distinctness facts.

• Building and Surveying: Relative Fundamentality in Karen Bennett's Making Things Up Analysis 2019 (Abstract) (PDF)

  
  I discuss Bennett's characterization of the more fundamental than relation.

• Laws of Nature, Explanation, and Semantic Circularity The British Journal for Philosophy of Science 2017 (Abstract) (Link to PDF)

  
  Anti-Humeans come in many varieties, but Anti-Humeans about laws are united in their opinion that laws must be something “over and above” the Humean mosaic. My aim is to defend Anti-Humean accounts of laws against Humean accounts. Here I argue that Anti-Humean accounts of laws are preferable to Humean accounts because Humean laws lack explanatory power.

• The Metaphysics of Identity: Are Identity and Distinctness Facts Fundamental? Philosophy Compass 2017 (Abstract) (PDF)

  
  This is a (weakly) opinionated survey paper. Identity and distinctness facts are ones like, "The Eiffel Tower is identical to the Eiffel Tower", and "The Eiffel Tower is distinct from the Louvre." This paper concerns one question in the metaphysics of identity: Are identity and distinctness facts metaphysically fundamental or are they nonfundamental? I explore some answers to this question.

(Short) Book

• Identity Cambridge University Press Elements Series 2022 (Abstract) (Link) (Notes and Errata)

  
  Identity criteria are powerful tools for the metaphysician. They tell us when items are identical or distinct. Some varieties of identity criteria also try to explain in virtue of what items are identical or distinct. This Element has two objectives: to discuss formulations of identity criteria and to take a closer look at one notorious criterion of object identity, Leibniz's Law. The first section concerns the form of identity criteria. The second section concerns the better-regarded half of Leibniz's Law, the indiscernibility of identicals. The third section turns to the more controversial half of Leibniz's Law, the identity of indiscernibles. I consider alternatives to Leibniz's Law as well as the possibility that there are no adequate identity criteria to be found.

Website

Thanks to Martín Abreu Zavaleta for designing this website.